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205051

Facts, values, and the naturalistic fallacy in psychology

Svend Brinkmann

pp. 79-93

Abstract

The relationship between facts and values is tremendously intricate in psychology, as in the other human and social sciences, which take as their object of interest human beings as acting persons. Often, two premises are taken for granted in ­scientific psychology: First, that only statements of fact can be objectively true, while statements of value can be nothing but expressions of subjective preferences. Second, that there is an unbridgeable logical gap between factual and evaluative statements so that no descriptive statement can entail an evaluative statement (without the addition of some evaluative premise).

Publication details

Published in:

Brinkmann Svend (2011) Psychology as a moral science: perspectives on normativity. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 79-93

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7067-1_5

Full citation:

Brinkmann Svend (2011) Facts, values, and the naturalistic fallacy in psychology, In: Psychology as a moral science, Dordrecht, Springer, 79–93.